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The rationing of health care is not new. If we are
interested in the origins of health economics we
should remember 1699 (not quite a tercentennial).
This was the year that William Petty published his
discourse that evaluated many things including human
beings in "Political Arithmetick". Since then the
investment in health has depended on the wealth ofthe
individual or state and the emphasis on health
provision. In 1978 the World Health Organisation met
at Alma Ata and defined the factors that led to the
allocation of primary care resources; economic
conditions, socio-cultural attitudes and political
characteristics.
One of the greatest problems with publicly funded
health care is ahighrate ofinflation. As the population
becomes relatively more elderly greater demands
ensue. Improvements in imaging and treatment
technologies result in cost increases which are
additional to underlying inflation. New drug therapies
are expensive to develop and therefore newer drugs
cost more. Politicians and the media have artificially
raised expectations that have financial implications.
The failure to keep up with "medical hyperinflation"
was most dramatically seen in Britain in the 1980's.
Inability to finance real cost increases led to cuts in
services, although many politicians, in "Marie
Antoinette" fashion, insisted that things were getting
better.
Professor Ham has calculated that the real annual
increase in hospital funding during the 1980's was
1.6% above general inflation. This was insufficient to
match medical inflation and produced a cumulative
deficit in hospital funding. The public were misled by
statistics that seemed to indicate that the finances of
hospitals were improving in relation to baseline
inflation but this was oflittle relevance.
This kind ofdealing in fiscal semantics brings to mind
Mark Twain's biographical remarks, attributed
originally to Benjamin Disraeli, "There are three kinds
of lies, lies, damned lies and statistics". Hansard also
attributes this phrase to Harold Wilson.
Statistics were often quoted which were at variance
with popular perceptions. New units for monitoring
activity in treatment episodes were introduced which
were viewed with suspicion by health professionals.
Civil service surrealism was in full sway, to a degree
that the Jonathon Lynn and Antony Jay's fictional
characters Sir Humphrey Appleby or Bernard Wooley
would have endorsed.
Health care depends on taxation and the performance
of the general economy. The United Kingdom rate of
growth fell in the 1980's. There was a dogma that
almost any cut in public spending was desirable,
,regardless of the consequences. The attempt to try to
replace a mixed economy with a service dominated
system was not entirely successful. The visible trade
balance that had been within two thousand million
pounds of breakeven since the 1950's, deteriorated.
There was a year on year deterioration from 1980 as
the manufacturing base was reduced. By 1990 the
visible trade balance bottomed out at minus twenty
thousand million pounds annually. Between 1970 and
1995 the percentage of the workforce in
manufacturing had declined from 33.7% to 15.4%.
Adherence to the simplistic monetarist policies
consistent with "sound economic management" saw
the British economy decline relative to our trading
partners. In 1995, the group of G7 nations recorded
Britian firmly in last place behind Italy and France,
ranked according to gross domestic product [GDP] per
head ofpopulation.
By 1988, the fraction ofGDP spent on health was only
5.9% which was below all of our major economic
competitors. There was a repetitive underspend each
year in the British health system. The King's Fund
Institute published a national cumulative
underfunding between 1981 and 1988 of £1,800
million for hospital and community services. Only
five countries, in the greater European Area, spend
less on health than the UK (expressed as a fraction of
GDP). These countries include Turkey and Portugal.
Not only do our major competitors spend a higher
fraction of GDP but the higher GDP per head in those
countries produces a multiplier effect. Proportionately
greater amounts are spent on patients by countries
such as Germany and France.
The oft vented assertion that we waste less in our
system, is not borne out by comparative data, that
indicate higher standards of health care in other
countries. Examples are found in perinatal mortality,
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survivalfollowing myocardial infarction andincertain
cancers. Significant financial efficiencies have been
made and further reduction in spending creates
pressure to reduce existing services. By 1990 we had
already seen a reduction in the numbers of hospital
nurses and the closure of no less than 4,000 beds.
[National Association of Health Authorities and
Trusts]
Health spending has been described as a bottomless
pit. Enoch Powelldescribed an "infinity ofdemand" in
'ANew lookatMedicine andPolitics'. Such facile but
fallacious logic is often used to defend decisions
where improvements in healthcare have been
prevented because of significant cost implications.
This is seen in the underprovision of intensive care
beds.
In the early 1980's a working group under Norman
Fowler looked at alternative funding for health. While
private financing was attractive this would lead to
higher spending with some improvements in health, as
evidenced by the USA. The cheapest system was to
use taxes to pay for health while central control could
restrict growth in provision. No official report from
this working party was ever published.
Improvements were obviously needed in NHS
management and the "grocer" Roy Griffiths produced
a report of how the system could be changed to more
closely resemble "Sainsbury's" efficiency. Many good
quality managers were appointed and major changes
were foreseen. However, when political interference
became rife, many ofthese managers resigned.
The Department ofHealth and Social Services realised
that cuts would have to be made by health authorities.
No guidance was given to where these cuts should be
made. No official recognition of the inevitable cuts
was politically palatable and a new term was coined,
Cost Improvement Programmes [CIP's]. These
programmes were introduced and were frequently
euphemisms for many service cuts. Propaganda was
more important than actual improvement in treatment.
In the 1980's there was steadfast opposition to public
acceptance of rationing or honestly, admitting that
certain services could no longer be provided by the
NHS. The Government determinedly ensured that the
finance debate should not be raised. Instead of
recognising the effects of serious underfunding, the
emphasis was put on blaming the existing system of
delivery for the majority of the problems. This is a
recurring theme.
Originally described by Enthoven in 1985, the idea of
a market where hospitals would compete for resources
was given the full backing of some politicians. The
idea was developed by organisations not universally
acclaimed for their concerns for the sick or
disadvantaged members of society. It was actually the
Adam Smith Institute and the Centre for Policy
Studies that developed the ideas of 'The Internal
Market'.
Kenneth Clarke drew upthe whitepaper, "Working for
Patients", published in 1989. This had major
implications for acute hospital services. With great
political wisdom, it was stated that the real aims ofthe
changes were to raise standards of care, to place a
greater emphasis on health promotion and to offer a
wider choice. It was suggested [perhaps a little
cynically] that the changes might detach politicians
from criticism for inevitable future cuts by blaming
health authorities and acute hospitals instead. The
majorproblemofunderlying cumulative underfunding
was not to be corrected. The government and DHSS
would not openly admit that certain areas of health
care might need to be removed from the NHS if
stretched health authorities and acute hospital units
were to handle difficult situations.
Stresses became clear between health authorities and
hospital trusts as aresult ofgovernment underfunding.
Since those in power in these organisations were often
regarded by the public as "bungling bureaucrats",
blame could be very effectively removed from "the
centre". Many people believed that the mythical
administrator's paradise of St Edward's Hospital [in
"Yes Minister"] was close to real life. This was a very
efficienthospital with many offices and administrators
where "there would probably be some patients when
the financial situation has eased up".
It would be wrong not to recognise the improvements
in many aspects of the National Health Service since
the White paper of 1989. Management is vastly
improved at hospital level. Financial control is better
and the importance of strategic planning is realised.
From the patients' point of view the service is better
focused and more accountable. Despite popular
assumptions, the fraction of costs attributed to trust
hospitals' management is low, considering the
complexity and relative size of the budgets. This area
is likely to become a target for "efficiencies" as
cumulative underfunding, the real problem, persists
and other scape-goats are sought.
Resources have been appropriated in the past, based
on selective medical assumptions and compounded by
management consultants' teams who were 'feeling
their way' in the new seller-buyer scheme for health.
In surgical services the assertion that procedures
would become overwhelmingly laparoscopic and
associated with short-term admissions was embraced
by government departments despite lack of evidence.
The belief that fewer elderly patients would require
admission to medical units was wishful thinking. Self
delusion about future demands seemed to be the order
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ofthe day because it fitted fiscal restrictions.
The role of management consultants in all of this
would be amusing ifthe resources spent on them were
not so large. One executive described management
consultants as "experts" who borrowed your watch
and then charge to tell you the time.
Health economics has come ofage in the 1990's NHS.
Terms such as value for money and cost-benefit ratios
are glibly used by people who know little of their
precise meaning. Lord Kelvin correctly stated that
when one can numerically quantify a problem one is
half-way to solving it. However the units of cost
comparison againsthealth gain are not as simple as the
units oftemperature change. Itis importantthat we use
the measurements of health care versus costs in a
scientific attempt to assess priorities not an
"AppletonWooley" theatrical exercise in mathematical
semantics tojustify short-term savings.
We do not have a credible science of health
economics. The simplistic concepts presently used in
this area are limited in their usefulness. Policy
decisions always have been the result ofmaking value
judgements, setting priorities and calculating how we
can best achieve them. Inthe general economy, growth
and efficiency are firmly bound. All macroeconomic
changes have distributive results and inevitable
implications for equity. Against this background,
public health economics has not yet begun to grapple
with the major problems of determining how much
should be spent.
The most basic economic assessment of treatments
requires a step analysis consisting of the selection of
alternatives, costing and comparison of outcomes.
Unfortunately we place an emphasis on the short term
costings. There is a lack ofunderstanding ofwhat cost
means in a limited overall budget. In these situations
costs need to be defined in terms of the opportunity
that has been denied if the investments were diverted
to their best alternative use. There is no useful strategy
or model that allows a mechanism for determining
'best alternative use'.
Best alternative use in trust terms may be that which
improves the hospital's image. This is seen when
technologically advanced high profile specialties
which are relatively overresourced expand, to the
detriment ofless glamorous areas. For the community
the best possible use might be to replace cheap
psychiatric drugs with more expensive versions that
ensure better patient compliance.
Cost-effectiveness is a crude measure that must not be
used as a stand-alone factor to determine policy. It
simply produces a ratio of a measured effect, such as
the cost of a treatment for one patient for one month
divided by the percentage of patients successfully
responding to the treatment. Equal importance is given
to increments of cost and effect, even when the effect
is saving lives! It is only of guaranteed ethical value
when used in its special variant of cost-minimisation
where the clinical outcome is the same for different
treatments at different costs. Cost-effectiveness
measurement is useful in a factory making washers
regardless of how many are damaged and thrown out
as a result of the process. This may not be a good
model for assessing health-care funding. In healthcare
individual outcome is ofenormous importance. When
the most cost-effective drug is not the most effective
drug, because ofdisproportionately high costs, ethical
problems arise. Is it right to use the most cost-
effective treatment when a number ofpatients are thus
deprived of a cure? Cure may have been achieved by
the use of a less cost-effective but more effective
treatment in the first place.
TABLE 1.
Ethics versus economics
Cost per unit Effectiveness Cost-effective ratio
Vaccine A [VA] £100 100% £100/100%= £1 per 1%
Vaccine B [VB] £20 50% £20/50% = £0.4 per 1%
VA is 2.5 times more expensive than VB per 1% effect [£1 versus
£0.4]
VA should still be used as it would be unethical to leave 50% of
the population unprotected
In a theoretical example two vaccines are available to
prevent a severely maiming or fatal disease. [Table]
Vaccine A [VA] costs £100 per person and is 100%
successful. Its cost- effective ratio (CER) is one pound
per one per cent treated successfully. Vaccine B [VB]
costs £20 per person and is 50% successful with a
CER of only £0.4 per one per cent. If we allow cost-
effectiveness alone to make our decision we should
use VB, but that would leave 50% unprotected. VA is
the ethical choice. So why do the cost-effectiveness
calculation? One cynical view may be that this ratio is
useful tojustify limiting investment.
While many policy makers and budget holders use
cost-effectiveness as a defence for decision making
one suspects they are like the drunk leaning against a
lamp-post. They are using the structure more in
support a weak position than as a means of
illumination.
Other problems exist with cost-effectiveness ratios. In
pharmacutical studies the effect measured may be
selected to suit the drug produced by the organiser of
the study. Patient selection criteria may enlist those
who will show the greatest effect with a particular
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drug. The side-effects of a drug are not measured in
cost-effectiveness studies. Most importantly, in
controlled studies compliance is high in well
motivated patients who have side-effects carefully
explained to them, and who are more likely to
complete courses of treatment. Drugs that must be
taken with an empty stomach and have high levels of
side-effects may have very different cost-effectiveness
outside controlled studies. When patients do not fully
comply with the optimum conditions drugs may not
act properly.
More sophisticated indices of the relative 'worth' of
drugs exist. Cost-benefit analysis is frequently quoted
but rarely measured since it is almost impossible to
calculate accurately. Cost is related to all the benefits
and disadvantages that result from treatment. If a
patient's arthritis is improved one should take into
consideration the cost of the quicker wearing out of
shoes.
The most promising prospect is the use of cost-utility
analysis. Here a value is put on the clinical
improvement often using QALY's [Quality Adjusted
Life Years]. By having amonetary value on both sides
oftheequation, costs andimprovements canberelated
in direct terms. This may be unattractive to budget
controllers. It is hard to opt for a drug that saves a few
pence per day when the advantages to the patient can
be measured in several pounds per day. Alas, the
interest in health economics is frequently anti-
intellectual and used to justify cuts rather than to
investigate the value oftreatments.
Rather than an emphasis on simplistic economics in
the NHS we need to research the value ofgood health.
We must evaluate health education more fully and
investigate methods of improving this with long-term
analysis of cost implications. The debate about the
inefficiency or efficiency ofa purchaser-provider split
remote from central budget holders will persist. The
real debate as to what should be expected of a health
service seriously underfunded over many years has
been unpalatable to politicians in the past.
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